

# CYPRUS REVIEWED

Edited by  
**Michael A. Attalides**

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**The Result of a Seminar on the Cyprus Problem  
held in June 3-6 1976 by the Jus Cypri  
Association and the Coordinating Committee  
of Scientific and Cultural Organisations**

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# FROM COEXISTENCE TO CONFRONTATION: THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN CYPRUS

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Although the Cyprus Question has been treated as a regional problem in world politics and the focus of those concerned with it has been mostly on interaction at the international level, I believe that in order to fully appreciate the impact of international pressures, it is necessary to round up the examination of foreign policies with a consideration of domestic developments at the receiving end. The distinction between domestic politics and international relations is only an analytical one; foreign policies do not operate in a vacuum but are conditioned by the domestic realities of the states involved. As covert and overt forms of foreign intervention are increasingly becoming a core element of the foreign policies of major powers today, the mystique of a neo-imperialism tends to obscure the fact that intervention and imperialism in their subtle contemporary forms are possible to a considerable extent because domestic conditions in the "host" country provide the needed opportunities. There is no doubt, of course, that the dynamics of domestic politics are manipulated and distorted by foreign interference in directions that facilitate the objectives of intervention, but to attribute all developments within a country to outside manipulation without looking at domestic structures would amount not only to oversimplification but also to a mystification of such notions as foreign penetration and imperialism — a mystification that ultimately undermines the possibility of a critical social science.

It is for these reasons that I propose to discuss the nature of ethnic strife in Cyprus by identifying the factors, domestic as well as external, that went into the making of the conflict. By looking at the dynamic of social and political change domestically and at the impact of outside

factors, I hope to convey a scene of the dialectic between endogenous and exogenous forces which constitutes the essence of every political situation. Indeed, I would like to suggest that a systematic examination of domestic developments in all their complexity constitutes the best foundation of a full appreciation of the effects and real proportions of external influences, manipulation and intervention. It is only in this way, I think, that one can become fully aware of alternative possibilities in the development of events, potential choices and lost opportunities on which meaningful social and political criticism can be based.

This brief paper seeks to conceptualize the issues arising out of the history of ethnic relations in Cyprus in the light of the theoretical perspectives offered by the study of social change. What I attempt here is not a history but an interpretative essay, and all I hope to accomplish is to touch upon and identify the many issues and problems that need to be studied in order to attain a full understanding of the nature of ethnic conflict in Cyprus.

The research problems I would like to address could be stated in terms of Fernand Braudel's conceptualization of the historical destiny of insular Mediterranean on the basis of a contrast which, according to the great French historian, marks the fate of the Mediterranean islands. The contradiction runs between the "precarious, restricted and threatened" internal life of the islands and their external life, "the role they have played in the forefront of history... The events of history often lead to the islands", Braudel observes, but he immediately adds "it would be more accurate to say that they make use of them."<sup>1</sup> These are precisely the topics with which my research project is concerned: an examination of the threatened internal life of Cyprus and the uses that the events of history have made of the ethnic differences that have marked Cypriot society.

## II

In considering the problem of the origins and the processes leading up to conflict, the natural starting point is the historical and social situation in which conflict is absent. This, of course, is the stable context of traditional society in which ethnic and social groups do not question their station in life but go about following deeply entrenched patterns of behavior and thus have no occasion to come to blows.

In Cypriot traditional society we encounter a remarkable phenomenon of ethnic coexistence which represents an extension to Cyprus of the pattern of Greek-Turkish, or more accurately Christian Orthodox-Moslem

symbiosis that has characterized the rural life of Ottoman Asia Minor from the late Middle Ages until the expulsion of Asia Minor Greeks in 1922-24.

Coexistence in a traditional society was founded on a shared folk piety and a common life style conditioned by the agricultural cycle of rural life. The most eloquent testimony to this coexistence has been the ethnic geography of Cyprus which is marked by interspersed Greek and Turkish settlements all over the island and the existence, in addition, of many ethnically mixed communities. No predictable geographic pattern of ethnic settlement exists largely because a great part of the Moslem rural population was created by the Islamization over time of Christian village communities. This was a common practice in Ottoman years and was either the product of outright coercion or forced choice in view of escape from the capitation tax that came with conversion to Islam.<sup>2</sup> The names of Christian Saints borne by several Turkish Cypriot villages, especially in the Paphos and the Karpass regions, offer a convincing indication of these cases of Islamization.<sup>3</sup>

It should be made clear in this connection that this sort of evidence is not cited here in order to question the Turkish Cypriots' Turkishness — which as is the case with modern national identity generally, has to do more with states of consciousness and less with the "purity" of ethnic origins. All that is intended is to suggest a concrete explanation for the phenomenon of traditional coexistence which was essentially the product of the common provenance of the religious groups composing the population of Cyprus. "Voluntary" or coerced conversions might involve a change in religious practises and perhaps beliefs, but it did not fundamentally alter the character of traditional rural society: therefore people in different quarters of the same community or in neighbouring villages continued to behave and deal with each other as they did before.

A remarkable indication of the shared social and cultural identity of traditional Cypriot religious groups is offered by their common participation in the commercial and religious fairs organised in the towns and villages of Cyprus on the day of their patron saint. In the folk narrative poetry that sprang from these social congregations we find references to Christian and Moslem pilgrims and traders sharing in the worship and exchange occasioned on such days. The most important testimony of the shared cultural content of traditional life has been offered by the discovery among the Moslem peasantry of folk Akritic ballads in fuller versions than those which were recorded by folkore field researchers from recitations of Greek peasants.<sup>4</sup> This suggests graphically both the

community of culture and the greater attachment of the Moslem population to tradition.

Since conversion was essentially an act of economic necessity it is not surprising that acceptance of Islam did not involve radical social and cultural change. Especially since the Christians — as well as the Jews — were considered “people of the book” by Islamic sacred doctrine and thus they were decisively distinguished from pagan heathens, their incorporation into the body of the faithful did not require any fundamental changes in their mode of existence. This naturally secured their continuing symbiosis with their former coreligionists. For the same reason, forms of religious syncretism were not only possible but to a certain degree tolerable to the popular practice of Near Eastern Islam which accepts Christian Saints and their miracles in its hagiology.

A case in point is offered by the borderline sect of *Linobambakoi* (linencottons), the Cryptochristians of Cyprus. As suggested by their name, they partook of two entities, practised the rites of both Islam (publicly) and Orthodox Christianity (covertly) and their double identity was graphically expressed in the fact that each person used to have a Christian and Moslem name.<sup>5</sup> Evidence is also available indicating that intermarriage between Moslems and Christians was practised in the past, especially under the Ottomans, without a requirement of religious conversion.<sup>6</sup> This practice continued to be encountered with increasing infrequency down to the recent past.

These phenomena of syncretism and symbiosis can be understood in the broader context of the civilization of the Middle East. In this great meeting ground of faiths religion, after the consolidation of Islamic rule, has not traditionally been a source of conflict but on the contrary it fostered other social needs like coexistence of different elements in the same historical space. Religion became a pretext of conflict only whenever it was politically manipulated to that end. Even then, as the tragic experience of the Lebanon in the mid 1970s suggests, it is no more than a cover for other forces working to subvert the *modus vivendi* achieved by the peoples of the area.

The aforementioned are just a few examples of traditional inter-ethnic coexistence which have persisted down to our own time (i.e., well after the ethnic differentiation of the two Cypriot communities and the development of Greek and Turkish nationalism in the island) in the form of agricultural cooperation and social intercourse in the context of the integrated village unit of rural Cyprus. Therefore, it seems that the first cluster of research problems facing the student of the history of ethnic

relations in Cyprus will involve the exploration in systematic detail of the forms of ethnic coexistence in traditional society. A model of such an examination is offered by Speros Vryonis in his study of Christian-Moslem symbiosis in Asia Minor following the Islamization of the country in the 11th - 15th centuries.<sup>7</sup>

These phenomena which pointed towards the emergence of an integrated Cypriot society, were essentially the product of shared conditions of existence and the basic needs of survival set by the land-bound pattern of life in traditional society. There could be no more real source of the pattern of coexistence. This can also explain the depth, tenacity and resilience of the phenomena of interethnic coexistence despite the sharp distinctions on the level of formal ideology between the two religions and the deontological requirements that derived therefrom. These requirements aspired to keep the faithful of each religion apart and formed the basis of formal institutional arrangements in Ottoman Society, designed precisely to actualize this separation. This of course was conditioned by socioeconomic needs and the social division of labour among the nationalities of the Ottoman Empire. Some observers deduce from the incompatibility of formal Islamic and Orthodox doctrine and its institutional consequences, the impossibility of social coexistence between members of the two religions at the grass-roots. Despite the institutional and deontological obstacles however, coexistence at the grassroots was murdered by socioeconomic needs which fostered also a relevant cultural climate. As it will be shown in a moment, the institutional context and violence from above disrupted these integrative potentialities from time to time and historical developments blocked their evolution.

The foregoing analysis of the nature of ethnic coexistence is not meant to suggest that everything was peaceful and idyllic in the traditional society of Ottoman Cyprus. The previous sociological observations should be understood against the background of certain important facts of history: in short that the Ottomans not only came and settled in Cyprus by means of a violent conquest<sup>8</sup> but that their rule was very oppressive, arbitrary and often violent; that this period was punctuated by internal conflicts and insurrections of Christians and Moslems and that on one occasion (1821) the Turks killed the prelates and scores of lay Christian notables ostensibly because a revolution had broken out in Greece. These events must be explained for the arguments about traditional coexistence to make full sense.

The conception of traditional coexistence presented here, derives essentially from an analysis of the social structure and the nature of social relations in Ottoman Cyprus. In a basically agrarian society Christian

Orthodox and Moslem peasants were respectively at the basis of two systems of social control. According to the *millet* principle of Islamic sacred law,<sup>9</sup> membership in each power structure was determined on the basis of formal religious identity regardless of the character of actual religious practices and beliefs at the grassroots which were stamped throughout by a great deal of syncretism. In each structure ultimate control lay in the hands of the Ottoman pasha and the aghas, and the Orthodox hierarchy respectively. A careful scrutiny of the available historical sources clearly suggests that in all those occasions (1665, 1680, 1712, 1764-65, 1783, 1804)<sup>10</sup> that troubles and outbreaks of various forms of violence are recorded, conflicts came as either violent protests from below (in which Christian and Moslem peasants joint forces) against oppression from above (usually excessive rapacity and tax exactions), or power struggles within the local Ottoman structure or between the powerful groups heading the two *millets* in the island. The latter contests arose whenever either group tried to monopolise authority in the island. Since the Turks controlled the material means of coercive power they had a definite advantage in these power struggles (as proved to be the case in 1821) except when the prelates managed to appeal successfully to the Sublime Porte. It follows that in none of these cases does it make sense to talk of ethnic violence: methodologically this would mean interpreting events out of their historical and social context by projecting subsequent social situations into the past. To insist to see ethnic violence even in the dramatic events of 1821 in Cyprus, is not just a misreading of history but it is a projection into historical explanation of the interpretative theses of nationalist historiography which capitalised on the powerful symbolism of that tragedy.

In the Ottoman social context oppression from above in fact consolidated the conditions of coexistence at the grassroots: it stimulated common protests in various forms (risings, appeals to the Porte) in which formal religious distinctions subsided before shared claims to the right of survival, thus setting in the social experience of the Cypriot religious groups valuable precedents of common action. Also by forcing upon Christian peasants the choice of mass conversion (of which there is evidence as late as 1825-28)<sup>11</sup> to escape the rapacity of the tax collectors, it corroded ethnic differences and extended the social basis of coexistence as it has been explained above.<sup>12</sup>

Indeed the dynamic of coexistence nurtured by these conditions could work itself out unobstructed when an extended period of tranquility and order was made possible in Cyprus in the last fifty years of Ottoman rule

in the nineteenth century. A British consular report (dated 1862) on the condition of the island in this period, states that "the Moslems live in peace with their Christian neighbours in town and country."<sup>13</sup> The continuation of tranquility and order in the several decades following the British occupation in 1878 allowed this harmony to survive down to the third quarter of the twentieth century despite the vicissitudes of nationalism and the process of ethnic differentiation at work in this period.

### III

Against the background of coexistence in traditional society one should try to trace the process of ethnic differentiation that culminated in communal conflict. This transformation began with the gradual growth of Greek irredentist nationalism in Cyprus. The first stirrings of nationalism were felt in the island early in the 19th century, with Cyprus' responses to the Greek War of Independence and the first formal expression of the desire for union with Greece, *enosis*, in an appeal of the Cypriot prelates and lay notables to John Capodistria.<sup>14</sup> The nationalist movement for *enosis* was to be intensified later in the 19th and 20th centuries, and it essentially represented an extension to Cyprus of the same historical phenomenon that elsewhere in Europe took the form of the Italian Risorgimento, the movement for German unification, and the irredentist movements of the Balkan nations. In Cyprus the elite nationalism of the early 19th century spread and took effective hold among the urban population by the middle decades of the century.<sup>15</sup> From 1878 onwards, under the British, the movement gained momentum partly because the Ottoman regime was replaced by a more tolerant administration.<sup>16</sup>

Economic change and social mobilization, slow but steady during the first decades of British rule, were the preconditions of the intensification of nationalist demands.<sup>17</sup> The penetration of nationalism from the cities to the rural areas through the channels of church, school and political and economic patronage provided the mass basis for the development of the *enosis* movement into a potent political force in the politics of Cyprus.<sup>18</sup> All available evidence suggests that by the 1920s Greek nationalism had effectively socialized the cadres of rural communities. This was the decisive turning point in the transformation of what had been the political aspiration of a section of the political elite into a mass movement. Economic discontent springing from the extreme underdevelopment and rural poverty prevailing in Cyprus up to the Second World War, strengthened the appeal of nationalism which in this context took up the meaning of a

protest against the neglect of the colonial government.<sup>19</sup> An additional stimulation came from the frustrated social aspirations of rising urban groups of professionals and intellectuals, recently returned from Athens where they had been trained at the National University and imbued with the ideals of Greek nationalism which up to 1922 was going through a particularly militant phase. Deprived from a voice in the affairs of the island by the exclusivist outlook of the British administration which disdained dealings with the "natives", they turned to militant nationalism.<sup>20</sup> Thus as all these new social groups were drawn into politics, their needs and aspirations for increased political participation were translated into pressures for more effective representation tied to incessant nationalist manifestations in favour of union with Greece.

In their nationalist clamouring politically conscious Cypriots felt psychologically heartened by the principle of nationalities that was stirring European politics in the years before and after the Great War. In this connection one should emphasize the importance of the entire complex of psychological and moral appeals that contributed greatly to the momentum of the *enosis* movement — a dimension of the problem that Anglosaxon scholars have always totally misjudged and failed to appreciate. It is true that nationalism in Cyprus as elsewhere emerged as a byproduct of social and political change, external influences and domestic political struggles as will be suggested in a moment. Its appeal and spiritual force however was largely due to the sense of dignity it helped infuse in the Cypriots, the yearning for national redemption after so many bitter historical experiences, a feeling of identity with a cultural entity which possessed a meaning wider than the parochialism of the Ottoman periphery. In the context of all this an ancient Hellenic culture which had survived the vicissitudes of foreign conquests seemed to find its becoming meaning and the historical heritage of Cyprus was endowed with what was felt to be its proper symbolic significance.<sup>21</sup>

The political struggles developing within Cyprus strengthened the dynamic of nationalist claims. The escalation of nationalist agitation by diverting attention from socioeconomic needs and cultivating an emotional climate of solidarity in pursuit of a collective national goal, was preempting pressures from below that social change now made possible. Such potential pressures coming from lower social strata could question the monopoly of political authority enjoyed by those leading the nationalist movement — the Church and the lay notables who controlled the economic life, the professions and the press. The creation of a Communist Party (KKK) in this period (1926) was just an indication of what forms social

and political pressures from below could take. Finally, despite their shared control over the affairs of the Greek Cypriots, short and longer term disagreements and antagonisms between the ecclesiastical hierarchy and lay politicians tended to intensify nationalist agitation as the contesting parties tried to neutralize each other by outbidding the opponent in nationalist zeal.<sup>22</sup> Such was the dynamic of the political situation on the eve of the uprising of 1931.<sup>23</sup> With this spontaneous uprising Greek Cypriot nationalism reached its major peak in the pre-War period. The revolt began in the cities but found widespread responsiveness in the countryside, thus showing the great strides of nationalism among the Greek population of Cyprus.<sup>24</sup> At the same time this was a symptom of the widening process of ethnic differentiation.

As nationalism grew among the Greek Cypriots and as demands of broader political participation rose against British colonial rule, the Turkish Cypriots, as well, became increasingly conscious of their ethnic identity and their rights of participation in controlling the affairs of the island. The formal expression of this developing political outlook has been the consistent opposition voiced by the leaders of the Turkish Cypriots to the Greek nationalist demands and their drive for union with Greece. The Turkish Cypriot leaders usually sided with the British in blocking Greek nationalist aspirations, although instances of interethnic cooperation especially over financial issues, were not entirely absent in this period. The dire poverty and the pressing economic needs of the population induced interethnic cooperation in the Legislative Council during the opening decades of British rule. In the 1880s and 1890s cooperation was general in the effort to promote solutions to the financial problems and basic socioeconomic needs of the island. This pattern of sustained cooperation broke down around the turn of this century, when the Greeks insisted on raising the issue of union with Greece in the Council. Until then the *enosis* aspiration was voiced outside the Council and this made interethnic cooperation possible. The important fact, in any case, is that the interethnic disagreement over the national status of the island remained academic, was confined to the elite level, and was never strained enough to cross the threshold of violent ethnic conflict.<sup>25</sup> It can be suggested, therefore, that although the dynamic of ethnic differentiation was in the making throughout the period up to the Second World War, this was still a period characterized by the absence of ethnic conflict: significantly, the Greek rising in 1931 marking the height of *enosis* agitation did not provoke any interethnic incidents.

A dimension of social mobilization that contributed greatly to ethnic

differentiation was the expansion of literacy. As literacy grew and cultural symbols became more significant, the awakening of primordial sentiments<sup>26</sup> drew the two Cypriot communities apart. The crucial factor here was the development of the educational systems on the model of those of Greece and Turkey respectively. As the educational values and curricula of the mainlands were transplanted to Cyprus, the symbolism of nationalist antagonism that grew out of the historical confrontation of the two nations was also transposed to Cyprus. The shared folk piety and values of pre-modern rural society subsided as the traditional religious and linguistic differences developed into the bases of a distinct Greek and a distinct Turkish national consciousness. In the context of the new symbolism the Cypriots found themselves divided into two communities that felt themselves to be parts of two nations which fought their wars of independence against each other. As young Cypriots went to study in the universities of Greece and Turkey, this attachment to their respective motherlands was intensified. The ethic of Greek patriotism was even more stressed by the mainland teachers sent to Cypriot schools, and the nationalist historicism and ethnographic research that spread from Greece to Cyprus provided the scientific bases for the nationalist belief system.<sup>27</sup> The Turkish Cypriots were always a few steps behind in these developments, but belatedly they have also tried to build up their scientific apparatus to sustain their ethnic claims.<sup>28</sup>

The importance of this cultural aspect of ethnic differentiation cannot be adequately emphasized. It provided the context within which the two Cypriot communities became conscious of their primordial attachments and the basis of their socialization into Greek and Turkish nationalism respectively.<sup>29</sup> As a result, a commonly shared system of social communication that could conceivably form the basis of an integrated Cypriot society was precluded from developing.<sup>30</sup>

To round up this analysis of the internal dynamics of ethnic conflict one has to look at the economic aspects of its development as well. What should be noted in this connection is that for reasons going back to the internal social evolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Greeks along with other Christian nationalities, started on the road of economic modernization earlier than the Moslems. Thus, although landed property remained in the hands of Turkish beys, the new wealth coming from commerce was concentrated in the hands of the new Christian middle classes.<sup>31</sup> These 19th century developments in the economic history of the Ottoman Empire affected the long-term prospects of ethnic conflict in Cyprus in that the pattern of differential economic modernization of the two communities

added an important structural dimension to their future antagonism. It is characteristic to note that at the end of the British period the Turkish Cypriots owned a percentage of agricultural land holdings slightly higher than their share of the population, but in their overall share of the island's wealth they were estimated to be worse off than what their numerical proportion of the population would warrant.<sup>32</sup> This clearly reflects their inadequate participation in the more modernized sectors of the economy such as commerce and industry — a problem originating in their historically conditioned delay in economic modernization. Such was the economic aspect of ethnic relations in Cyprus when the ethnic conflict erupted in the 1950s. The further ethnic segregation that was consolidated in the 1960s only intensified these inequalities in levels of economic development.

Social and cultural change provided the internal dynamic of ethnic differentiation, but the effective context for the process was set by British colonial policy.<sup>33</sup> In contrast to the French, who used French language and culture as a medium of assimilating their colonial subjects, the British, partly because of their experiences in India in the mid-19th century, followed a policy of indirect rule and tried to limit interaction with the peoples of the colonies to the necessary minimum.<sup>34</sup> As a consequence, they relied on local power structures and the communal organization of society in managing the domestic affairs of the colonies and as a rule discouraged social or ethnic integration.

In Cyprus this meant that the traditional Ottoman system of social organization based on the religious *millets* would survive under the British. Thus a regime which according to British imperial ideology aspired to bring the blessings of modern liberal civilization to its colonial peoples, was essentially creating the conditions for the survival of traditional corporatist forms of social organization. Furthermore the politicization of these traditional corporatist structures and the ideals that sustained them, under the impact of modern nationalism, undermined decisively the prospects of a liberal political culture — something that British influence could conceivably have nurtured. This contradiction has provided still another condition making for ethnic conflict: the absence of a political culture that would view individuals on their own right regardless of their ethnic origin.

It is obvious that all this sustained very effectively the ethnic differentiation developing in societies with diverse religious, linguistic or racial groups — like Cyprus. The consequence was that the system of horizontal interethnic bonds forged in traditional society was gradually undermined and eventually broken. Thus British administrative practices not

only contributed to the gradual destruction of the potential bases of an integrated society in Cyprus but by preserving and politicizing traditional power structures, most notably the Orthodox Church and its civil functions, provided the leadership to potential ethnic conflict.

The immediate benefits of this policy consisted in the manoeuvrability it allowed the colonial administration in playing one group against another and thus keeping ultimate control to itself — a policy implemented largely through the Legislative Councils of the colonies, an institution which Cyprus experienced between 1881 and 1931. A classic technique of colonial administrations (usually realized by pitting a minority community against the aspirations of the majority), in the longer run this policy meant that the infrastructure and mechanisms of confrontation would be present once ethnic differentiation had worked itself out in consolidating fully fledged and self-conscious communities, and the approach of independence would trigger contests over prospective spoils.<sup>35</sup>

It is probably important to conclude this analysis of the dynamics and processes of ethnic differentiation by noting certain important instances in which traditional coexistence could be transformed into modern forms of organized interethnic cooperation in the face of the continuing consolidation of two distinct national communities. The identification of such cases in Cypriot historical experience essentially provides the empirical basis of a conception of alternative courses of development that could have led to the emergence of an integrated society in Cyprus, despite the existence of two different cultures.

The most important case in point has been the development since the interwar years of an organised working class movement which in promoting shared social claims provided the context for the systematic cooperation of Greek and Turkish Cypriot workers. It is significant that this movement was led by the left which because of the content of its ideology could stress the community of social rights and aspirations and thus deemphasize the ethnic strains nurtured by the nationalism of the right. Separate Turkish Cypriot trade unions did not appear until 1943 when the first symptoms or organised separatist tendencies emerge among the Turkish Cypriot political elite. Turkish Cypriot workers however continued to participate massively in the unified left wing syndicates until the late 1950s. A Turkish Cypriot trade unionist who persisted in this attitude was murdered in 1965 by the extremists of his community because he opposed ethnic separation and stressed the need and possibility of coexistence.<sup>36</sup> (Three years earlier, in 1962, two Turkish Cypriot journalists who were taking similar stands in their newspaper,

had met with the same tragic fate). Well before these sinister trends could appear in ethnic relations, interethnic cooperation was making great strides in municipal politics in the face of nationalist agitation in the 1940s, indicating still another case in which shared problems and interests could counteract and essentially arrest developing ethnic cleavages.<sup>37</sup> Finally in the countryside the forms of traditional agricultural cooperation (share-cropping, disposal through intermediaries of the other ethnic group) could naturally develop into common participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriot peasants in the Cooperative Movement which since the early part of the twentieth century provided credit and marketing opportunities for agricultural products.<sup>38</sup> In all these instances of organized coexistence one can detect the seeds of potential social integration. Subsequent developments in ethnic relations which have led certain foreign observers to stress the impossibility of coexistence in Cyprus because of a presumed incompatibility of culture, should be reevaluated in the light of the evidence presented in this and the previous section.

#### IV

The culmination of the process of ethnic differentiation in the consolidation of structurally and culturally distinct and often antagonistic communities, deeply conscious of their primordial attachments, sets, of course, the preconditions of ethnic conflict. In this context, the drift to ethnic violence can easily begin once antagonism and suspicion are created in view of certain events, policies and choices. This was essentially the pattern developing in Cyprus in the aftermath of the Second World War. Since this is not a history of ethnic relations in Cyprus, I will not attempt to detail the sequence of events stretching from the mid-1940's to the mid-1950's which built up to the point of ethnic explosion.<sup>39</sup>

The heightened hopes of self-determination raised by promises during the Second World War, the intransigence of the Cypriot nationalists bred by the repressive British policies following the abortive rising in 1931, and the intensified political struggle in Cyprus between left and right found expression in the formulation of an uncompromising policy of self-determination, demanding nothing less than union with Greece in the shortest possible time.<sup>40</sup> The refusal of the British to even discuss any change in the status of Cyprus, a vital base for their Middle Eastern strategy, the example of anticolonial armed struggles elsewhere, and the strong support for the cause of Cyprus' freedom voiced in Greece, nurtured the

idea of an armed revolt to be carried out by a secret organization of Cypriot freedom fighters. The fighting broke out on April 1, 1955. Although the fighting raged between British troops and Greek Cypriot fighters, the prevailing tension and sense of urgency fostered a climate of ethnic suspicion.

The evolving political outlook of the Turkish Cypriot political elite meanwhile was showing the first symptoms of separatism. In 1943 a Cyprus Turkish Minority's Association was established, replaced in 1945 by the Cyprus Turkish National Party. Two years later this party took the stand that in case the British left Cyprus, the island should "go back to Turkey". The decisive turn however is indicated by the change of the party name to "Cyprus is Turkish Party" in 1955. From then on with British encouragement initially and systematic direction from mainland Turkey throughout, a group of organized extremists (known as Volkan and later TMT) managed to bring the entire Turkish Cypriot community under its firm grip and to impose a monolithic singleness of purpose in promoting the objective of ethnic separation and eventual partition.<sup>41</sup> This triumph and entrenchment of extremism among the Turkish Cypriots — something that the extremist fringes of EOKA despite repeated attempts failed to achieve on the Greek Cypriot side — has functioned as one of the most exacerbating elements in the ethnic conflict in the twenty years from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s by providing one of the major domestic conduits of outside intervention and distortion of ethnic relations.

The mechanisms of the precipitation of ethnic violence were created soon after the outbreak of liberation struggle in 1955, as a body of auxiliary Turkish Cypriot policemen was set up by the colonial administration to help in hunting down the Greek Cypriot fighters and as secret armed organizations of Turkish Cypriots were formed to promote Turkish plans for the future of Cyprus. The fatal example was already set with the anti-Greek riots instigated by the Turkish government in Istanbul and Izmir in September 1955. It took the killing of a few auxiliary policemen to trigger the eruption of ethnic conflict in its ugliest forms, with street rioting, killing and arson from 1956 onward. Ethnic antagonism was fortified by the support of Greece and Turkey for their ethnic communities in Cyprus. All available evidence points to the fact that the Turkish government consistently incited ethnic rioting which was initially tolerated by the British administration in order to force the Greeks to compromise.<sup>42</sup> The long process of ethnic differentiation had finally been exacerbated enough by external factors and influences that it plunged Cyprus into ethnic conflict.

With independence in sight, i.e., when the British finally indicated their willingness to discuss the future status of Cyprus, the two communities did not close ranks. As considerable comparative evidence suggests, the period just prior to independence is considered by feuding ethnic groups as providing the last possible chance for the achievement of their maximalist objectives. Inevitably conflicts over the spoils tend to erupt.<sup>43</sup> In Cyprus discord developed over both the form and the method of independence. The Greek Cypriots, pointing at their overwhelming majority in the population and at their historical claims in the island's past, clamored for union with Greece through the exercise of the right of self-determination. The Turkish Cypriots, abandoning their initial wish for the continuation of British rule, asked for partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, if not wholesale annexation of the island by Turkey, to be decided through international agreements by the interested outside powers, Britain, Greece and Turkey. Both positions encountered considerable difficulties. The aspiration of union with Greece faced almost insurmountable international opposition from every conceivable direction. The argument for partition was domestically an impossibility except at enormous human and material costs in view of the absence of any ethnically homogeneous regions in the island. At any rate, such a solution, although repeatedly suggested or threatened by Britain and actively promoted by Turkey, was bound to encounter all out resistance on the part of the Greek Cypriots. The international ramifications of all this created what came to be known in the 1950's as the Cyprus Question.<sup>44</sup>

When considerable international pressure led to a compromise settlement in 1959 and after protracted negotiations Cyprus emerged as an independent Republic on August 16, 1960, the ethnic conflict remained unresolved and simmering beneath the surface of events.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, the ominous signs of future strife could be gleaned from the repeated disagreements that strained the work of the committees drafting the constitution of Cyprus in 1959-1960. Many of the points of contention that appeared then were to reemerge as the major issues in the conflict that subverted the Republic of Cyprus in 1963-64.<sup>46</sup>

The constitutional framework of the Republic of Cyprus was designed to accommodate, but not to resolve, the ethnic conflict. Through an apparatus of intricate formulas and cumbersome structures, all premised on ethnic dualism, it froze and sanctioned ethnic division. Instead of encouraging cooperation, it institutionalized separatist tendencies in its provisions for ethnic voting and split municipalities. As a consequence, the public life of Cyprus was oriented by the very spirit of its constitution

in the direction of ethnic antagonism instead of turning towards the democratic development of socially based party politics. The nature of the fundamental law of the Republic of Cyprus was aptly described by a distinguished legal expert who observed that in this case "constitutionalism has run riot in harness with communalism."<sup>47</sup>

The tragic misconception of the Cyprus Constitution lay in the effort to overcome ethnic conflict by freezing ethnic divisions and distinctions and by stressing the bi-communal character of the state. The only way, however, to make the new state viable and capture the allegiance of the ethnically divided population for a political system which did not embody symbolic aspirations, was by creating the machinery and services that would effectively meet the practical needs of the entire population. Effective performance of such services in the context of a development oriented secular welfare state could have provided a basis of *loyalty* which national symbols and primordial sentiments could not furnish. Subsequent experience with economic development and prosperity during the fourteen years of the island's independent statehood made it possible for this instrumental loyalty to the Republic to emerge in an incipient and uncertain form in the political culture of Cyprus.<sup>48</sup> On such a basis a set of policies could be initiated in the direction of what Clifford Geertz has called an "integrative revolution."<sup>49</sup> What this would be aiming at might be described as the development not of any form of communal assimilation, which was undesirable to both sides, but a common stake in peaceful coexistence based on the shared benefits of socio-economic development and democratic politics.

Whatever potential there might have been for such a development, it was effectively blocked by the institutionalization of ethnic dualism in the 1960 Constitution and as the turn of events was to show, by outside interference. The hopelessness of the situation was to become evident in the divisive dynamics and the psychological uneasiness of post-independence politics in Cyprus, ridden (as is soon appeared to be) with disagreements and discord. The Greek Cypriots resented what they felt to be an unfair share of the bargain: although they had set aside their cherished aspiration of *enosis*, the final settlement gave them less than what their proportion in the population and their contribution to the economy would warrant. The disappointment of Greek nationalism and the sense of deprivation felt by the behavior and their apprehension concerning the eventual objectives of the Turkish Cypriots, whose uncompromising attitude over the immediate implementation of all the separatist provision of the Constitution was felt by the Greeks to be motivated by a desire to promote partition.

Indeed, the Turkish Cypriots were overzealous in pressing for full enjoyment of the prerogatives awarded them by the 1960 Constitution, arguing that this was the only way to cope with the overwhelming numbers of the Greeks. Therefore, the Turkish Cypriots remained extremely suspicious of any suggestions of change in the constitutional *status quo*. The outcome of all this was tension and escalating antagonism culminating in the constitutional impasse of 1963 and the breakdown of the 1960 settlement amidst renewed ethnic violence.<sup>50</sup>

The eruption of a new wave of violence on Christmas 1963 and the communal fighting that punctuated the tragic year 1964, reaching a climax with the bombings of Northwestern Cyprus by the Turkish air force, represent just a new and more intense phase of the ethnic conflict of the 1950s which had remained unresolved. A wave of rioting and street fighting erupted at the end of December 1963 following the submission of the thirteen amendments to the Cyprus Constitution proposed by President Makarios in November of that year. The new ethnic explosion was used by Turkey and later in 1964 by the United States as a pretext in order to impose partition upon Cyprus (Acheson Plan). Although this was averted in the face of active Cypriot resistance and international, especially Soviet, opposition, this new phase of ethnic conflict was marked by a decisive segregation of the two Cypriot communities from 1964 onwards. The ethnic confrontation was crystallized as the Turkish Cypriots consolidated their control over a number of territorial *enclaves* which became "no-go" areas for the Greek Cypriots and where a great part of the Turkish Cypriot community was insulated.

Territorially the enclaves were based mainly on the Turkish quarters of the major cities or on clusters of Turkish villages in the countryside and were formed by population movements into these areas. Initially, these population movements appeared, and indeed were presented to be, as a quest for safety and refuge during the charged atmosphere of ethnic confrontation in 1964. Gradually, separate administrative structures were developed to govern these areas which, however, remained economically unviable and utterly dependent on Turkey for their survival. The fact that many people were kept as idle refugees in the enclaves and were prevented from going back to their villages even after the relaxation of tensions in the late 1960s, suggests that the whole movement was designed to modify the ethnic demography of Cyprus and to create a partial geographical basis for some form of ethnic separation.<sup>51</sup> All evidence that has been made available later tends to corroborate this view of the intentions of Turkish policy.<sup>52</sup>

After the 1963-64 breakdown, the consolidation of the enclaves, and the consequent crystallization of ethnic confrontation, relations between the two Cypriot communities exemplify certain structural dimensions which can form the analytical basis for comparisons between the ethnic conflict in Cyprus and similar phenomena in other ethnically diverse societies. The set of five dimensions of ethnic conflict suggested below is not, of course, intended to constitute a model or even a "middle-range" conceptualization for the analysis of ethnic conflicts, but it is presented here simply for heuristic purposes and as a departure for comparative observations.

- A. Quantitatively the conflict has been relatively simple: a single numerically dominant group (80 per cent of the population) is confronted by a single strong and stubborn minority.<sup>53</sup>
- B. Spatially the conflict does not fit into any conceivable pattern of geographic distribution of ethnic groups. There has been no pattern of regional concentration, no ethnic segregation on an urban-rural dichotomy. Ethnic mixture geographically has persisted even after the consolidation of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. It has been violently subverted only after the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus and the refugee wave that has uprooted the Greeks from the North, temporarily one hopes.
- C. Sociologically ethnic division in Cyprus has not involved a system in which ethnicity and stratification coincide. Communal division has not been identical with class or status, but ethnic differentiation is horizontal, not vertical, encompassing two parallel social structures, each with its own stratification.<sup>54</sup>
- D. Politically neither the majority nor the minority has been predominant over the other, exercising a monopoly of power. Further, there has been no division of control over different sectors of social activity (e.g., economy vs. government).
- E. Internationally linkages with external entities have been quite pronounced. Both groups in Cyprus feel strong attachments to wider ethnic unities outside the island, and these ties tend to intensify the conflict domestically and to telescope it internationally.

The preceding structural analysis should throw into relief the reasons for the intensity of conflict in Cyprus. Quantitatively the conditions of ethnic balance are absent; geographically the loci of potential friction have been many. The strong external linkages make domestic politics very vulnerable to foreign influences and international instability. The presence of fully fledged and autonomous social structures in each group

may have been responsible for the crystallization of ethnic polarization.

In turn, as conflict tends to be intensified and the groups pull further apart, the dynamic of confrontation acquired powerful social psychological momentum. So long as the groups keep apart direct communication is obstructed by the structural dimensions of conflict, reality is distorted by prejudice, insecurity and lack of information. Misperceptions thrive on stereotypes and misconceptions of the other side's objectives and interests, thus perpetuating suspicion and hostility. Consequently, conflict acquires an important subjective component, dependent on sets of values and perceptions of the motivations of the other side.<sup>55</sup> In the Cyprus situation, after the communal segregation of the 1960's, the failure of the Turkish Cypriots to believe that the Greek Cypriots sought independence and not union with Greece, despite occasional official allusions to the latter, froze the relationship of conflict.

A moment of reflection and self-criticism on the part of the Greek Cypriots over this issue will probably reveal that their own ideological ambivalence did not help much in inspiring confidence to their Turkish Cypriot compatriots. Furthermore it might be relevant to point out that more could and should be done by way of practical measures and social policies to help build up such confidence among the grassroots of the Turkish Cypriot community, especially those who remained outside the enclaves. It is certainly true that all governmental gestures in the direction of normalization were systematically obstructed and blocked by the advocates of separatism and terror who dominated the ranks of the Turkish Cypriot leadership — but one cannot escape the thought that more persistence and more imaginative policies might have been more effective. The problem has been that the social and ideological framework within which the question of the Turkish Cypriots was faced by most of the Greek Cypriots, fell short of those conceptions and initiatives that might have led towards ethnic reconciliation and reintegration by bringing about the necessary social changes. If these were the failings of the Greek Cypriots, the persistence of the Turkish Cypriots in a separatist behaviour and their repeated rejection of reconciliation gestures with evident bad faith, did nothing to allay the suspicions and fears of the Greeks concerning partition.<sup>56</sup> As a consequence, ethnic relations remained in a situation of stalemated conflict for most of the period 1964-1974.

This analysis of the dynamics of ethnic conflict in Cyprus has yet to be rounded up by a brief discussion of the impact of outside influences and intervention, admittedly the most catastrophic and exacerbating source of conflict. But before turning to this topic, one still has to raise a critical question concerning the nature of ethnic conflict. It has been shown in this paper that conflict tends to appear as an ethnically diverse society advances towards modernity. All comparative evidence tends to support this view, and recent theoretical arguments, starting from a consideration of this evidence, have questioned very convincingly the older social science orthodoxy concerning the homogenizing and integrative effects of modernization.<sup>57</sup> Therefore, one is confronted with the question whether and up to what point ethnic conflicts with all their enormous human and other costs are inexorable and tied to some kind of determinism.

I think that a consideration of the experience of Cyprus can suggest the elements of an answer to this question, and I would like to conclude this paper by looking at this problem. It has been suggested in a comparative study of the possibilities and strategies of conflict regulation in six divided societies that the crucial element in successful conflict management is the motivation of political leadership to gradually reduce the level of conflict and bring it under effective control.<sup>58</sup> *Prima facie* it would seem that the conflict in Cyprus reached the levels of intensity it did, especially in the 1956-58 and 1963-64 phases, because such a motivation to control it was absent, and the political leaders concerned preferred to press for the full achievement of their objectives rather than accept compromise. This suggestion is put forward here as a point of discussion to be resolved by further research, but the evidence I have been able to examine so far seems to support this view.

However, a change in orientation is obvious, at least as far as the Greek Cypriot leaders who controlled the Government of Cyprus were concerned, after the 1963-64 crisis. Their motivation to pursue a policy of conflict regulation is evident in the receptivity they showed to the mediating and peacekeeping activities of the United Nations in Cyprus. A very constructive gesture in this direction was the acceptance by the Government of Cyprus of the U.N. Mediator's Report on Cyprus, a document of enlightened statesmanship suggesting general principles, political guidelines and specific institutional arrangements designed to meet the basic requirements of all involved in the Cyprus conflict and to create the preconditions of peaceful coexistence of the two communities.<sup>59</sup> Although the Turkish Cypriots did not show the same receptivity and rejected

the report and its recommendations, their acceptance of the presence of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force on Cyprus (UNFICYP) made it possible for the force to accomplish its remarkable record of reducing friction and practically eliminating violent clashes on the island in the years 1968-1974, thus setting the preconditions of security and safety that were necessary for any moves in the direction of conflict resolution.<sup>60</sup>

Indeed, with United Nations encouragement things seemed to be developing in that direction with the initiation of intercommunal talks in June 1968. Thus, a channel of direct communication between the two communities was established with the purpose to negotiate a commonly acceptable solution. In an atmosphere of relaxation of ethnic tensions the talks proceeded in several phases, and allegedly, disagreement was narrowed down to the problem of the extent and form of local government.<sup>61</sup> If all the other problems concerning the constitutional structure of the state had indeed been resolved, this can only mean that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders had finally realized that a settlement was possible, and they were trying to work it out. If this was so, their behavior and motivation were in pace with political and economic developments on the island which were pointing toward the direction of conflict resolution.

The growth of political realism and moderation in the late 1960's made it possible for a policy of independent statehood to be adopted as the safest course for Cyprus. This became official policy when in 1965 the recommendations of the U.N. Mediator were accepted by the government of Cyprus and were popularly endorsed in two democratic elections in 1968 and 1970. Thus, the fundamental objection of the Turkish Cypriots to *enosis* was satisfied and this should have opened the way for accommodation. In the post independence political climate the all-encompassing nationalist alignment that inherited the political legacy of the liberation struggle, broke up and new political parties emerged representing the interests and aspirations of social classes.<sup>62</sup> This new socially based politics might have conceivably cut into the ethnic cleavage and contributed towards interethnic political cooperation over social issues. Earlier instances of Greek-Turkish cooperation in trade unions or over the cause of intercommunal coexistence, although suppressed when the ethnic conflict flared up, indicated that such development was possible.<sup>63</sup>

Economically, the great strides of development and industrial expansion<sup>64</sup> were opening job opportunities for the Turkish Cypriot workers who were kept secluded and idle in the enclaves. An expanding economy could have easily allowed the resumption of increased economic contacts in all commercial and industrial sectors once the separatist policy "from

Turk to Turk", pressed on the Turkish Cypriots by their leaders, had been abandoned. Thus, some form of economic reintegration of Cypriot society could have been attained which would have also provided a way of redressing the inequalities in the levels of economic development between the two communities.<sup>65</sup>

Against the arguments for the reintegrative potential of economic development, one might point that in a Greek-dominated economy, the Turkish Cypriot workers could have been reduced to the condition of an exploited proletariat. This however need not necessarily be the case, since legislative measures and syndicalist organization can provide effective safeguards against such a turn of events. Furthermore syndicalist organization against possible exploitation by the employers in a capitalist economy, could promote — as it did in the past — interethnic cooperation.

As Cyprus was entering her second decade of independent life, the hopeful signs of development, prosperity and conflict resolution inspired a sense of optimism and confidence in her people. The continuing inter-ethnic coexistence and cooperation in several mixed communities of rural Cyprus, historically a feature of the Cypriot countryside, was a living indication that despite the bitter experience of conflict, peace was a possibility within the prospects of the island.

We may now return to the question of the inexorability of ethnic conflict. It seems that modernization and social change may bring ethnic differentiation, rising ethnic consciousness and eventually conflict, but it is also reasonable to suggest that once the relative costs and benefits of conflict and coexistence are realized and the appropriate political motivations mature, change and development can, in fact, be seen to possess great potentialities which can contribute constructively to conflict resolution. The problem of ethnic conflict, therefore, becomes one of direction, at least after a certain point in the process of modernization. The critical issue, then, is motivation in the management of the effects of change.

The only effective way to achieve this it would appear, is by means of imaginative social planning designed to redress inequalities, heal psychological traumas and insecurities, efface the antagonism of cultural symbols. All this might mean fundamental changes in the structure of society which would certainly have required courage, imagination and generosity to accomplish, especially on the part of the stronger, majority community. Perpetuation of conflict and the concomitant opportunities to foreign manipulation that this means, is essentially the result of a failure to conceive the problem in this way and of unwillingness to proceed with the needed changes. It is by looking at the problem in this way that

a sound method of social criticism can develop — a critical method that might also be suggestive in planning future courses of action.

A caveat should be immediately added, however. In making a claim about the manageability of conflict, I am fully aware of the great difficulties with the evidence. Whatever indications can be gleaned from the experience of Cyprus make a rather weak case, and many other important cases point in the opposite direction. Therefore, although cases of conflict resolution and successful integration can be found, one has to be very cautious in one's claims. In the particular case that concerns us here I would like to make it clear that by conflict resolution I certainly do not mean to suggest any form of ethnic assimilation and the creation of a new integral nationality — this I think has been empirically impossible in Cyprus, given the existence of two fully fledged and articulate communities, both very zealous of their identities. Further, I am not even sure whether a turn of events in the direction of assimilation was desirable. But other forms of integration, especially in the economy and other spheres of practical activity, certainly were both possible and desirable in an age of consolidation of wide economic units. Therefore, the hopeful trends and possibilities of conflict resolution which I indicated a moment ago, could be conceived as elements in a potential *modus vivendi*, in an accommodation of basic ethnic needs in a bi-national secular society — an accommodation that might appear even more attractive in view of the costs of the alternatives.

After the identification of these positive elements and incipient trends in the direction of conflict resolution, it is relevant to ask why they never came to fruition. It is at this point that the examination of outside influence and interference becomes the most important element in understanding the evolution of the ethnic conflict in Cyprus. This analysis has, therefore, to conclude by looking at the disastrous effects of the exogenous sources of conflict.

Enough has been written on this subject so that only a few reminders are needed here. The first source of outside instigation of ethnic conflict in Cyprus has been Turkey with its policy of partition. The idea of partition was suggested by the British in the 1950's and has been espoused by Turkey since then. Despite various ostensible modifications of this policy, Turkey has pursued this objective ruthlessly in the last two decades. Partition in the form of the geographical separation of the two ethnic communities and the concentration of the Turkish Cypriots in one region was proposed by Turkey as the official Turkish position to the U.N. Mediator in 1965.<sup>66</sup> The ethnic conflict in Cyprus has been fostered by

Turkey in order to undermine the independence of Cyprus in the pursuit of partition, and the intercommunal negotiations were repeatedly blocked from Ankara when they seemed to reach a point of agreement. This policy was justified by general security considerations and concern for the safety and welfare of the Turkish Cypriots. It seems however that the benefits in foreign policy bargaining and from the domestic manipulation of the Cyprus issue carried a heavier weight in the motivations of the decision-makers in Ankara.<sup>67</sup>

Greece also embarked on a reckless policy designed to undermine the independence of Cyprus, once the military dictatorship was established.<sup>68</sup> Enough evidence is now available concerning the repeated attempts at violent overthrow of the government of Cyprus in order to achieve the union of Cyprus with Greece with considerable territorial concessions to Turkey, thus achieving partition disguised as union. To promote these policies the Greek dictatorship encouraged right wing terrorism and subversion in Cyprus on a considerable scale. Since this campaign was conducted in the name of union with Greece, it scared the Turkish Cypriots and had generally adverse effects on the efforts to reach a resolution of the ethnic conflict through the intercommunal talks. The subversive activities culminated in the bloody coup of July 15, 1974 which succeeded in overthrowing temporarily the legitimate government of Cyprus, but also in precipitating the Turkish invasion and in bringing about the eventual disintegration of military rule in Greece.<sup>69</sup> As a consequence of the two Turkish offensives on 20-22 July and 14-15 August 1974, Cyprus has been partitioned with the Northern part of the island under Turkish occupation. This disaster has left the island in an enormous human tragedy. Thousands have been killed and wounded and thousands more are missing; one third of the population have become refugees. Such have been the human costs — to say nothing of enormous material damages and economic losses — of what the Turkish government has described a “peace-keeping” operation purporting to resolve domestic conflicts and to restore order in Cyprus. The only relevant comment that one can make is to note a macabre statistical comparison: the human cost of them years of ethnic confrontation has been less than one thousand lives; in the few weeks of Turkey’s “peace operation” more than six thousand people were killed.<sup>70</sup>

As it has been persuasively argued elsewhere, the policy of partition despite its incredible human, political and material costs which have become tangibly apparent after the 1974 tragedy, has been supported and actively promoted first as a collective NATO policy and later as the United States “ideal solution” for the Cyprus problem — ideal for what were considered

Western strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. A policy premised on Cold War assumptions and based on glaring misinformation, this has remained the approach of the U.S. to the Cyprus problem since the 1950s.<sup>71</sup> Although during the crises of 1963-64 and 1967 the United States tried to cool the situation through mediation, the policy of partition was urged as a permanent solution in 1964 by the Acheson Plan and was permitted to be violently implemented by Turkey in 1974. In the wake of this tragedy evidence is becoming available concerning covert American intervention and destabilization activities in Cyprus, especially in the form of direct or indirect — via the Greek CIA — encouragement of terrorist subversion against President Makarios.<sup>72</sup> Thus, both ethnic antagonism and intra-Greek dissension provided opportunities which facilitated American intervention in Cyprus.

The connections of these empirical facts about external intervention in Cyprus with the workings of ethnic conflict, will be better realized if the whole syndrome is considered in a broader framework. The combined effects of nationalist influences from Greece and Turkey and British administrative practices initiated and gradually consolidated ethnic differentiation in Cyprus. What this in fact meant was that two systems of closely woven linkages would tie the Cypriot majority and minority communities respectively with each of the two neighbouring countries which they considered as their motherlands. These intimate national, social and emotional attachments furnished the most effective channels through which domestic social and political processes in Cyprus could be influenced and directed from outside. The dependent foreign relations and the entrenched external influences in the politics of the two mother countries, provided an additional system of linkages through which international power politics and the pursuits of post-War imperialism in the Eastern Mediterranean could directly be felt in the domestic affairs of Cyprus. By means of these two levels of external linkages internal conflict in Cyprus has been effectively internationalized and its development and forms of resolution became dependent on factors external to the realities and needs of the people of the island.<sup>73</sup> Thus foreign strategic interests dictated by the Cold War and power politics in the Middle East have been decisive factors in the development of ethnic conflict within Cyprus.

In the context of all this, domestic conflict and the failures of local political leadership only facilitated the promotion of foreign interests at the expense of internal peace. On balance however, despite the political failures that have been noted earlier, the evidence presented in this essay is clear in suggesting a fundamental success of the government of Cyprus:

In ten years of continuing crisis marked by ethnic confrontation and relentless foreign pressures, it managed to secure the survival of Cyprus as an independent and unified Republic, thus setting a basic precondition of conflict resolution in the Island. It seems that precisely for this reason this government and its policies had to be destroyed before foreign designs on Cyprus could be put to work. Therefore ethnic conflict was exacerbated by external encouragement of extremism on both sides. The external linkages of Cypriot domestic politics were effectively used to this end. Ethnic extremism and systematic destabilization directed and financed from outside, set the stage for the violent attack and invasion which was designed to remove the nuisance offered to Western interests by a democratic and neutralist Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a consequence of the Turkish invasion and the presence of the occupation forces, ethnic relations have been further distorted by the violent destruction of ethnic settlement patterns, the colonization of occupied Cyprus by settlers from Asia Minor (who belong to ethnic groups different from the Turkish Cypriots) and the geographical separation of the two Cypriot communities which makes the continuation of cooperation in many spheres almost impossible. It becomes therefore once again evident that the decisive factors in the escalation of conflict and the consequent distortion of ethnic relations, have been external, *not* domestic. This conclusion is probably the most significant contribution of the analysis of the Cyprus case to the comparative study of ethnic conflicts.

It is against these overpowering external odds that the weak and precarious trends of conflict resolution had to take root in the life of Cyprus. We have now come full circle back to Braudel's argument after showing the uses that the events of history have been making of the threatened life of a Mediterranean island. Braudel is correct in stressing the critical importance of the unchanging geographical environment in determining the course of history. The bitter fate that her strategic location has brought upon Cyprus has borne this out once again in the long history of the ancient sea. One may thus conclude with Braudel by noting the imprisonment of man "within a destiny in which he himself has little hand, fixed in a landscape in a which the infinite perspectives of the long run stretch into the distance both behind and before". But since by following Braudel's historical method one is led to the "very sources of life in its most concrete, indestructible and anonymously human expression",<sup>74</sup> the real conclusion of this analysis of the ethnic conflict in Cyprus should be a human protest over the lost opportunities and the injustices that the good-hearted people of Cyprus have had to endure for no wrong doing of their own.

## APPENDIX

## A Statistical Profile of Ethnic Relations in Cyprus.

TABLE I: Population by religion at census years.

Religion	1881	1891	1901	1911	1921	1931	1946	1960
Greek Orthodox	73.9	75.8	77.1	78.2	78.8	79.5	80.2	77.0
Moslem	24.4	22.9	21.6	20.6	19.8	18.5	17.9	18.3
Armerian Gregorian	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	1.0	0.8	0.6
Roman Catholic	1.1	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.2	0.8
Maronite		0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.5
Other	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	2.8

TABLE II: Select characteristic of population by ethnic group: 1960 (%)

	Greek	Turkish
Urban <sup>1</sup>	68.7	20.4
Rural	81.8	17.0
University educated (Total: 100%)	80.5	19.5

TABLE III: Ethnic shares in select Consumer goods and services: 1963 (%)

	Greek	Turkish
Motor Vehicles	85.2	14.8
Radio — TV	80.8	19.2
Telephones	90.4	9.6

TABLE IV: Ethnic shares in the economy (%)

	Greeks	Turks	Armenians	Others
Income Tax (1958)	29.7	1.8	1.0	67.52
Land Holdings (1960)	78.3	20.43 <sup>3</sup>		1.3
Crop Production (1963)	87.4	12.64 <sup>4</sup>		
Vine Products (1962)	87	13		
Livestock Income (1963)	86	14		
Persons in Manufacturing (1962)	89.9	9.1		1.0
Mining Output (1962)	24.1	1.2		74.7
Imports 1(963)	78.7	3.2	5.3 <sup>5</sup>	12.8
Exports (1963)	57.5	0.3	6.4	35.8

Sources: Table I, Statistics and Research Dept., Republic of Cyprus *Statistical Abstract*, 1970, No. 16, (Nicosia, 1970), p. 24. Tables II-IV, Dept of Statistics and Research, Republic of Cyprus, *Statistical Data by Ethnic Group*, (Nicosia, March, 1964).

*Comments:*

1. Of all settlements (urban and rural) 50.3% are purely Greek, 6.8% are purely Turkish and 42.9%, including all urban centres, are mixed in their population composition.
2. This sum was paid mostly by foreign mining companies, showing how inordinately big a share of Cyprus' national wealth was under foreign exploitation.
3. This statistic should be read in light of a parallel figure concerning the percentage of Turkish Cypriot land holders: although the overall communal share of land holdings is 20.4% (above the Turkish share of 18.3% in the population) only 15.1% of the island's land holders are reported to be Turkish Cypriots. This discrepancy brings out graphically the higher concentration of land ownership among the Turks, which is a clear vestige of the quasi-feudal social structure of the community. This in its turn is not unrelated to the backwardness of the community in such modern sectors of the economy like manufacture and commerce.
4. In the production of the typical crops of traditional agriculture, wheat and barley, the Turkish shares were 20% and 19% respectively.
5. The Armenian record in the import-export trade indicates that a minority could engage in modern sector economic activities without constraints — other than those of its own historical experience, which delayed Turkish development in this direction.

NOTES

1. Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. by Sian Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) Vol. I, p. 154.
2. For the ethnological evolution of the population of Cyprus in the Ottoman period see Th. Papadopoulos, *Social and Historical Data on Population, 1570—1881* (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1965). On the origins of the Turkish Cypriots see C.F. Beckingham, "The Turks of Cyprus", *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 87, Part II (1957), pp. 165-174. On the ethnic geography of Cyprus see Alexander Melamid, "The Geographical Distribution of Communities in Cyprus", *The Geographical Review*, Vol. XLIV (July 1956), pp. 355-74.
3. Purely Turkish villages with names of Christian Saints have been the following: in Paphos, Saint John, Saint Nicholas, Saint George; in Limassol, Saint Thomas; in Nicosia, Saint Epiphanius (Solea); in Famagusta, Saint Chariton; in Karpas, Saint Iakovos, Saint Andronikos, Saint Eustathios, Saint Symeon. Turkish Cypriots were also living in many mixed communities bearing names of Christian Saints.
4. The pertinent material is deposited in the folklore archive of the Cyprus Research Centre.
5. On the Crypto-Christian group of the Cypriot *Linobambakoi* in the context of the religious syncretism of Ottoman society, see R.M. Dawkins, "The Crypto-Christians of Turkey", *Byzantion*, vol. VIII (1933), pp. 247-275. See also K. Chantzioannou, *Tà êν διασπορῇ* (Scattered Writings), (Nicosia, 1969), pp. 240-41 which cites additional bibliography.
6. Cf. A.C. Aimilianides, «Ἡ ἐξέλιξις τοῦ δικαίου τῶν μικτῶν γάμων ἐν Κύπρῳ» ("The Evolution of the Law of Mixed Marriages in Cyprus") *Κυπριακαὶ Σπουδαί*, Vol. II (1938), pp. 207-212. This holds mostly in Islamic sacred law regarding women marrying Moslem men. Although Orthodox Canon Law excludes the possibility of marriages between Moslems and Christians, this doctrinal requirement did not inhibit the practice of inter-marriage.
7. Speros Vryonis, Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh to the Fifteenth Centuries* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 444-497.
8. The meaning of the Ottoman conquest for the peasant masses of Cyprus is best conveyed I think, by the eighteenth century historian Archimandrite Kyprianos who remarked that the peasants joined the Turkish armies believing that they might liberate them from the plague of the nobility. See his (*Ἱστορία Χρονολογικὴ τῆς Νήσου Κύπρου*) (Chronological History of the Island of Cyprus), Venice, 1788, pp. ix, 294, 331.
9. On the meaning of the *millet* system see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 335.
10. Th. Papadopoulos, «Πρόσφατοι ἐξισλαμισμοὶ ἀγροτικοῦ πληθυσμοῦ ἐν

Κύπρω» ("Recent Islamizations of Rural Population in Cyprus"), *Κυπριακά Σπουδαί*, Vol. XXIX (1965), pp. 27-48.

12. My recent researches at the Archivio di Stato in Venice have strengthened and broadened my views as to the nature of traditional coexistence in Cyprus. During these researches I have examined two series of archival materials on eighteenth century Cyprus (A.S.V./Consolato di Cipro, especially vol. 20, 1703-1797 and A.S.V./Cinque Savii alla Mercanzia/Lettere dei Consoli/Cipro, vols. 647-653, 1721-1792. Besides many interesting details on interethnic relations at the grassroots, the clear evidence of the use of Greek as the lingua franca of the island etc., this material suggests that in the context of incipient capitalist relations that tend to emerge in Cyprus as a consequence of the activity of foreign consuls, Christians and Moslems participate indistinguishably in the same economic networks. Cf. also C.P. Kyrris, "Symbiotic Elements in the History of the two Communities of Cyprus", *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Political Geography* (Nicosia 1976), citing considerable historical evidence on various forms of traditional ethnic coexistence in Ottoman Cyprus.

13. Harry Luke, *Cyprus under the Turks*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1921), pp. 209-210. Cf. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, IV, p. 231.

14. On this first manifestation of the *enosis* movement see E. Protopsaltis, 'Η Κύπρος εἰς τὸν Ἀγῶνα τοῦ 1821 (Cyprus in the Struggle of 1821), (Athens, 1971), pp. 91-108.

15. A British consular report in 1866 notes that the townspeople had been inculcated with the Hellenic idea. Consular Correspondence, R.P.O., F.O. 329/1,29 October 1866; cited in Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, IV, p. 496.

16. For accounts of the *enosis* movement under the British see Hill, *op. cit.*, pp. 488-568 which is detailed but obviously biased. It should be read in the light of Doros Alastos, *Cyprus in History*, (London: Zeno, 1955), pp. 330ff. and Michael Dendias, *The Cypriot Question*, (Athens: Pysos, 1937).

17. On the connection between the process of social change (generally defined as modernization) and the politicization of group consciousness see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 32-39. The concept of social mobilization and its political consequences is used in this paper as defined by Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LV, no 3 (September 1969), pp. 493-514. Social and economic changes in Cyprus can be systematically document from the censuses collected by the British authorities every ten years since 1881.

18. According to a Colonial Office report at the beginning of the twentieth century the peasants were still unaffected by political agitation, but the spread of education was expected to stir them up too, P.R.O., Doc. No. C.O. 883/6, August 30, 1902. For the ways in which patronage networks and economic dependence helped in the penetration of nationalism in the rural areas see Michael Attalides, "Forms of Peasant Incorporation in Cyprus during the last Century", in Muriel Dimen and Ernestine Friedl, (eds.), *Regional Variation in Modern Greece and Cyprus: Towards a Perspective on the Ethnography of Greece* (N.Y.: The New York Academy of Sciences, 1976).

19. François Crouzet, *Le Conflit de Cypre*, (Brussels: Bruylant, 1973), pp. 61-93.

20. C.W.J. Orr, *Cyprus under British Rule*, (London, 1918), pp. 165-169. Orr's view on the social dynamic of the *enosis* movement has been criticised by Dendias, *The Cypriot Question*, pp. 179-83. A Colonial Office report several years before Orr wrote, noted that people who studied law and medicine in Athens returned imbued with Hellenic propaganda, bred on the precedent of the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece, P.R.O., Doc. no C.O. 883/6, November 28, 1901.

21. Dendias, *The Cypriot Question*, retains its pertinence for an understanding of the moral and emotional significance of Greek Cypriot nationalism.

22. For the sociological dynamics of the development of nationalism in Cyprus, see Kyriacos C. Markides, "Social Change and the Rise and Decline of Social Movements: The Case of Cyprus", *American Ethnologist*, Vol. I, no. 2 (May 1974), pp. 309-330.

23. For the details see Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, IV, pp. 543-48.

24. The best account of the 1931 rebellion is still that by Arnold Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1931* (London: Oxford University Press, 1932). pp. 354-394. For additional evidence concerning the rural responses to the nationalist uprising see the documentary material edited by Paschalis M. Kitromilides in *Κυπριακά Σπουδαί*, Vol. XXXV (1971), pp. 191-209.

25. In the eighty years of British rule only one minor incident of Greek-Turkish political violence is reported, over the Ottoman defeat in the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-12. Hill, *History of Cyprus*, Vol. IV, pp. 518-19.

26. For a definition of this concept and its political meaning see Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in New States," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 109-114.

27. For the development of Greek education in Cyprus under the Ottomans see Loizos Philippou, *Τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ Γράμματα ἐν Κύπρῳ κατὰ τὴν περίοδον τῆς Τουρκοκρατίας* (Greek Letters in Cyprus during the Tourkocracy), (Nicosia, 1930), Vol. I. See especially pp. 175-76 and 189ff. for details on the spread of education in the rural areas. For a similar study of the following period of British rule see Kl. I. Myranthopoulos, *Ἡ Παιδεία ἐν Κύπρῳ ἐπὶ Ἀγγλοκρατίας 1878-1946* (Education in Cyprus during the English Rule 1878-1946). (Limassol 1946). The first serious attempt to provide a scholarly study of the Hellenic character of the civilization of Cyprus is that by A. Sakellarios who in 1855-1868 published in two volumes his *Τὰ Κυπριακά* (Cypriot Matters) in Athens. This was a study of the geography, history and language of Cyprus. A second enlarged edition enriched with folklore materials appeared in 1890-91. This work essentially inaugurated the tradition of nationalist Greek scholarship on Cyprus. The first work by a Cypriot in this tradition was published in 1874 under the significant title *Φιλολογικαὶ Ἐπισκέψεις τῶν ἐν τῷ εἰῶ τῶν νεωτέρων Κυπρίων μνημείων τῶν ἀρχαίων* (Philological Researches on the Monuments of the Ancients surviving in the Life of Modern Cypriots), by G. Louka, a student of Sakellarios, during the latter's stay in Cyprus as a mainland teacher of Greek letters. This tradition of nationalist scholarship reached its culmination with the publication of scholarly journals like *Kypriaka Chronika* (Larnaka, 1923-37) and since 1937 *Kypriakai Spoudai*. For an interesting study of similar educational and cultural developments in another distant part of the Greek periphery in the 19th century, see Anthony Bryer, "The Pontic Revival and the

New Greece" in J.A. Petropoulos *et al*, eds, *Hellenism and the first Greek War of Liberation, 1821-1829: Continuity and Change* (to be published by the Institute of Balkan Studies, Thessalonike).

28. While the Greeks were actively engaged in the cultivation of nationalist scholarship and culture already in the 19th century, the Turkish Cypriot movement did not begin until the 1930s when a history of Cyprus in Turkish was published: Fikret Alasya, *Kıbrıs Tarihi* (Nicosia, 1939). This was a clear symptom of the nationalist influences of Atatürkism emanating from Turkey to Cyprus. On the political significance of the upsurge of nationalist scholarship in Turkey in the 1930s under the impact of Atatürkism, see Bernard Lewis, "History-writing and National Revival in Turkey", *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol. IV (1953), pp. 218-27. Cf. *idem*, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 318-55, 431-36. For the ethnic differentiation of the Turkish Cypriots and the transformation of their Islamic identity into Turkish national consciousness see C.F. Beckingham, "Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus" *Die Welt des Islams*. N.S., Vol. V (1957), pp. 65-83. For educational development see Ali Suha, "Turkish Education in Cyprus", *Πρακτικά του Α' Διεθνούς Κυπριολογικού Συνεδρίου*, (Proceedings of the First International Congress of Cypriot Studies), (Nicosia, 1973), Vol. III, Part 1 pp. 355-75.

29. On this point cf. the study as to how history teaching helped in the cultivation of the symbolism of nationalist antagonism: *Cyprus School History Textbooks: A Study in Education in International Mis-understanding* by the Education Advisory Committee of the Parliamentary Group for World Government, (London, n.d.).

30. For the theoretical foundation of this view cf. Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1953).

31. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 448-456.

32. Stahis Panagides, "Communal Conflict and Economic Considerations: The Case of Cyprus", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 5 (1968), pp. 133-145.

33. Cf. Adamantia Pollis, "Inter-group Conflict and British Colonial Policy, The Case of Cyprus," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 5, no. 4 (July 1973), pp. 575-99.

34. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians* (New York: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 10-11.

35. Captain Orr, who sincerely believed in the blessings of liberal civilization brought by British rule to the peoples of the Empire, was probably the first to question the wisdom of an administration which relies "on the permanent hostility between two sections of the population to carry into effect the policy of the Government" by noting its potential detrimental consequences. See *Cyprus under British Rule*, p. 106.

36. For details on interethnic cooperation in the trade union movement see *Χρονικό της Σύγχρονης Κυπριακής Τραγωδίας* (The Chronicle of the Contemporary Tragedy of Cyprus), published by the Central Committee of AKEL, Nicosia 1975, pp. 189-196. The following statistics are suggestive concerning the politics of trade unionism in Cyprus: the first trade union was established in 1932 with 84 members under left wing leadership; by 1960 the left wing trade union movement had 35544 members and by 1970 36000 members; the first Turkish Cypriot union was created in 1943 with 43 members; by 1960 the Turkish trade unions had 4381 members and by 1970, 3000 members; in 1944 a right wing trade union federation was set up with 758 members its membership rising to 5587 in 1960 and 21000 in 1970. See Republic

of Cyprus, *Annual Report of the Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance for the year 1970* (Nicosia 1971), p. 99.

37. For details see Pl. Servas, *Η Κυπριακή Τραγωδία* (The Cyprus Tragedy) (Athens 1975), pp. 21-35.

38. There is a general study of the Cooperative Movement in Cyprus by K. Angastiniotis, *Ο Συνεργατισμός, Γένεσις και Ανάπτυξίς του εν Κύπρω* (The Cooperative Movement, its Origins and Development in Cyprus) Nicosia, 1965. For an English language text, see *idem*, "Co-operative Development", in *Cyprus: A Handbook on the Island's Past and Present* (Nicosia: Greek Communal Chamber, 1964), pp. 223-234. The significance of the movement in the promotion of interethnic cooperation deserves a more systematic examination.

39. The history of the conflict between 1946-1959 is recorded in great detail in a recent synthesis of all available sources in François Crouzet, *Le Conflict de Chypre* (Brussels: Établissements Émile Bruylant, 1973), 2 volumes.

40. *Ibid.*, Chapters V-VII, shows in detail that despite their sharp ideological antagonism left and right followed in this period a militant policy of self determination that tended to mutually reinforce the demand for union with Greece.

41. For more details see Michael Attalides, "The Turkish Cypriots: Their Relations to the Greek Cypriots in Perspective", in this volume.

42. C. Chrestides, *Κυπριακό και Έλληνοτουρκικά* (The Cyprus Question and Greek Turkish Matters), (Athens, 1967), pp. 309-318 (in Greek) and Stephen G. Xydis, *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), pp. 125-130.

43. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The One-Party States of West Africa," in J. La Palombara and M. Wener, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 205 and Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), p. 22.

44. The two volumes by Stephen G. Xydis, *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation 1954-1958* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1967) and *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic*, as well as Crouzet, *Le Conflict de Chypre*, constitute the most important sources on the Cyprus Question in the 1950's. For a discussion of the relevant literature see N.P. Diamandouros and P.M. Kitromilides, "The Birth of The Republic of Cyprus", *Reviews in European History*, Vol. II, No. 2 (June 1976), pp. 297-303.

45. For the 1959-60 settlement see Crouzet, *Le Conflict de Chypre*, Vol. II, pp. 1073-1154 and Xydis, *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic*, pp. 337-460. For an incisive critique of the "solution" of the Cyprus problem, see C. Chrestides, *Κυπριακό και Έλληνοτουρκικά* (The Cyprus Question and Greek Turkish Matters), pp. 407-445.

46. Xydis, *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic*, pp. 477-514.

47. S.A. de Smith, *The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions* (London: Stevens, 1964), p. 285.

48. For a formulation of this changing outlook see T. Papadopoulos, «Η κρίσις της Κυπριακής Συνειδήσεως» (The Crisis of the Cypriot Conscience), (Nicosia), 1964, pp. 204-209.

49. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution". Φιλολογική Κύπρος.

50. The issues of the 1963 crisis are most adequately covered in Stanley Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government* (Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 1968). Note his analysis of the constitution (pp. 53-71), the constitutional tension areas (pp. 72-103) and the subsequent crisis and breakdown (pp. 104-134). The events of the crisis are also chronicled in Charles Foley, rev. ed., *Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 168-191. For the legal aspects of the 1963-64 crisis see Thomas Ehrlich, *Cyprus 1958-1967*, (Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 36-89.

51. Cf. Kemal Karpaz, "Solution in Cyprus: Federation," *The Cyprus Dilemma: Options for Peace* (New York, 1967), pp. 35-54, which presents the Turkish case on precisely that argument.

52. This evidence comes mostly from United Nations documents. See, for instance, Report of the Secretary General on the U.N. Operation in Cyprus, 12 December 1964, parags. 32 (19 *UN SCOR*, Supp. October-December 1964, pp. 230-231) and 10 March 1965, parags. 53-56 (20 *UN SCOR*, Supp. January-March 1967, pp. 118-119).

53. Cf. Geertz's typology in "Integrative Revolution," pp. 117-118.

54. Cf. D. Horowitz, "Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (January 1971), pp. 232-244.

55. Cf. John W. Burton, *Conflict and Communication* (New York: Free Press, 1969) and Herbert C. Kelman, ed., *International Behavior* (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1965).

56. John W. Burton, *World Society* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 55-59, 68-69, 75-77.

57. Walker Connor, "Self-Determination: The New Phase," *World Politics*, Vol. 20, no. 1 (October 1967), pp. 30-35 and *idem.*, "Nation-building or Nation-destroying," *World Politics*, Vol. 24, no. 3 (April 1972), pp. 319-355. For a recent empirical examination of this problem see Milton M. da Silva, "Modernization and Ethnic Conflict: The Case of the Basques," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 7, no. 2 (January 1975), pp. 227-251.

58. Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Cambridge: Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972).

59. Details on the operations of UNFICYP can be found in the relevant reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council, published in Supplements of the *SCOR* twice a year (in June and December) since 1964. See also Michael Harbottle, *The Impartial Soldier* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).

61. Polyvios G. Polyviou, *Cyprus in Search of a Constitution: Constitutional Negotiations and Proposals, 1960-1970* (Nicosia, 1976), pp. 81-315 gives a detailed account of the four phases of intercommunal talks (1968-1974) based for the most part on a systematic transcription of the repeated proposals of the two sides. A valuable addition to the bibliography on the Cyprus Question, it gives a sense of the evolution of the respective positions of Greek and Turkish Cypriots up to the eve of the coup and the invasion. Note in particular pp. 265-315 outlining the constitutional agreement allegedly reached in late 1973: this agreement provided essentially the constitutional basis for conflict resolution in Cyprus. Despite the progress on constitutional issues achieved in the talks and despite the constructive dynamic of conflict resolution through direct communication that this context provided, certain fundamental shortcomings pointed out by the critics of this method of negotiation as applied to Cyprus, have to be acknowledged: first the talks were held in secrecy — secrecy that kept

the concerned citizens and political parties of Cyprus in the dark as to what was discussed. This secrecy in addition made possible the exertion of external pressures which distorted the progress of the talks. Finally secrecy over the content of the discussions and the agreements announced from time to time, made in easy for the negotiations to be repeatedly obstructed by the Turkish side which on many occasions went back on earlier agreements. This was a tactic used by the extremists on the Turkish side to forestall any agreement that might bring normalization to the island.

62. A first attempt in the direction of an analysis of the political situation emerging in the early 1970s is made in Paschalis M. Kitromilides, *Patterns of Politics in Cyprus*, unpublished thesis, Wesleyan University, 1972.

63. For some glimpses into incipient trends in reintegration cf. Attalides, "The Turkish Cypriots: Their Relations to Greek Cypriots in Perspective."

64. For the achievements of economic development in Cyprus in a broad comparative perspective see *The UNESCO Courier*, February 1970, pp. 22-23. For more details see the Second and Third Five-year Development Plans, prepared by the Planning Bureau of the Republic of Cyprus.

65. On the economic situation of the Turkish Cypriots cf. Attalides, "The Turkish Cypriots: Their relations to Greek Cypriots in Perspective".

In this connection it is interesting to note the observation of Paul Sweezy, "antagonism between the Turkish minority and the Greek majority... could have been alleviated, or perhaps wholly overcome, in a healthy society such as would have been possible had Cyprus been able to dispose over the wealth of Mavrovouni," referring to the exploitation of Cyprus' mineral resources by an American corporation. See his "Foreign Investment," *Monthly Review*, June 1965.

66. Report of the U.N. Mediator, parags. 73-79, 97-98, 107-109. For the evolution of the Turkish views on partition since the 1950s, see Xydis, *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation*, pp. 78-79, 88-89, 92-93, 107-108, 166-67, 242-46, 334-45, 385-89, 511-12, 518-19.

67. For the manipulation of the Cyprus issue in Turkish domestic politics cf. Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic*, Cambridge, (Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 188 and Ferenc Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press 1971), pp. 78-114, 358-364.

68. On the policy of the Greek dictatorship toward Cyprus see Alexander G. Xydis, "The Military Regime's Foreign Policy," in Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos, eds., *Greece Under Military Rule* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 191-209. Some radical critics have argued that one of the major reasons for the advent of the dictatorship was the urgency of NATO and the USA to promote the partition of Cyprus, a policy opposed by both the government of President Makarios in Cyprus and the Papandreou government in Greece. See for instance Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front* (New York: Doubleday, 1970) pp. 124-141. Greek attempts to undermine the independence of Cyprus by promoting a NATO-oriented solution began already under the governments that followed the Papandreou administration in 1965. See Ch. Chresides, *Κυπριακό και Έλληνοτουρκικά*, pp. ix-cxxii and *idem.*, "Ακρωξ' Απόρρητον: Τò Πρωτόκολλο τής 17 Δεκεμβρίου 1966" (Top Secret: The Protocol of December 17, 1966), Athens, 1973.

69. The fullest account of these recent developments yet available is Laurence Stein, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus," *Foreign Policy*, no. 19 (Summer

1975), pp. 34-78. Another report on Greek-instigated subversion in Cyprus is J. Bowyer Bell, "Violence at a Distance: Greece and the Cyprus Crisis," *Orbis*, Vol. XVIII, no. 3 (Fall 1974), pp. 791-808, which, however, remains completely silent on American involvement.

70. A number of Congressional publications contain valuable information on the 1974 crisis, the invasion and the drama of the refugees. House Foreign Affairs Committee, *Cyprus 1974*, Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2nd sess., August 19 and 20, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974); Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Refugees, *Humanitarian Problems on Cyprus*, Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2nd sess., September 26, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974) and *Crisis on Cyprus: 1974*, Study Mission Report to the Subcommittee on Refugees, October 14, 1974. These documents incorporate many useful press reports on the problem. See also Stanley Karnow, "America's Mediterranean Bungle," *The Atlantic*, February 1975, pp. 6ff.

71. See Van Coufoudakis, "United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: A Case Study in Cold War Diplomacy" in this volume.

72. Stern, "Bitter Lessons", gives some indications in this direction. This view of the situation tends to be corroborated by the evidence of two other serious journalists, Eric Rouleau, in *The Guardian Weekly*, 24 August 1974 and Christopher Hitchens, "How Cyprus was Betrayed", *The New Statesman*, 24 October 1975. See also Christopher Hitchens, "Détente and Destabilization: Report from Cyprus", *New Left Review*, No. 94 (November-December 1975) pp. 61-75 for the political context of these activities. The investigations of congressional committees in the USA (especially by the Pike Commission, autumn 1975), have also produced evidence implicating American secret services in subversive activities in Cyprus. It is hoped that the full transcripts of these hearings will be made public to facilitate judgement on these controversial issues.

73. This conceptualization draws on George Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War" in James Rosenau, ed., *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 14-44 and James Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, (New York, Free Press, 1971) pp. 307-338.

74. Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, Vol. II, p. 1244.